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Abstract 
The rational and normative man models have predomi-
nated in the social sciences. This paper proposes an 
emotional man model as an alternative point of depar-
ture for analyses of individual, but also of collec-
tive and corporate action. The overall argument is 
developed in two steps. First, the concepts of "pure" 
and "constrained" emotional man are introduced and 
developed. Then an emotional interaction model ad-
dressing the theme of cooperation is presented. After 
engaging the cooperative interaction model to high-
light certain aspects of collective action, the author 
engages the concepts of "pure" and "constrained" emo-
tional man to provide a new perspective on corporate 
actors. 
* * * * * 
Bisher herrschen in den Sozialwissenschaften die Ma-
delle rationalen und normati ven Handelns vor. Diese 
Arbeit stellt ein Medell emotionalen Handelns vor, das 
als alternative Ausgangsbasis flir Analysen individuel-
len, aber auch kollektiven und korporativen Handelns 
dienen soll. Das zweistufige Argument beginnt mit der 
Darstellung der Modelle "reinen" sowie "eingeschrank-
ten" emotionalen Handelns. Darauf folgt die Darstel-
lung eines Modells emotionaler Interaktion in Situa-
tionen sozialer Kooperation. Verschiedene Aspekte kol-
lekti ven Handelns werden anhand dieses Model ls be-
trachtet. Die Konzepte des "reinen" sowie des "ein-
geschrankten" emotionalen Handelns eroffnen schlie~­
lich auch einen neuen Blickwinkel auf korporative 
Akteure. 
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The major purpose of this paper1 is to propose a model 
of emotional man as a complement to the models of 
rational and normative man. It is not its intention to 
argue that the model of emotional man should replace 
either of the other two. Rather it is to advocate 
model pluralism in lieu of the present model duopoly. 
The model of emotional man is useful because it helps 
to explain some aspects of collective action which the 
rational and normative man models cannot handle. It 
also offers a new perspective on corporate actors and 
suggests the many different ways in which corporate 
actors, usually considered from a rationalistic or a 
normative perspective, are in fact emotion-motivated 
emotion managers. 
1. Rational Man Model and its Limits 
In classical and neo-classical economics, rational man 
is posited as a free man and a free decision-maker. He 
is free in the sense that he can undisturbedly set up 
his preference order. While the generation of prefe-
rences is taken for granted in the classical model, 
the problem posed is that of a choice among means. 2 
I would like to thank Jens Alber, Jurgen 
Feick, Atle Midttun, Andreas Ryll, Brigitte Schenkluhn 
and Volker Schneider for valuable bibliographical 
suggestions and comments on the ideas for this paper. 
Constructive criticism of the first drafts of this 
paper came from Renate Mayntz, Fritz Scharpf, Uwe 
Schimank and Helmut Wiesenthal, whose contribution I 
gratefully acknowledge. 
2 Rational man has definite preferences about 
what he wants to achieve, but his problem is his lim-
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Yet, the freedom of rational man is constrained in 
this model of rational decision-making because he is 
obliged or compelled to follow certain rules in making 
his choices. 3 First, he is constrained by his own cost-
conscious, calculating rationality - the fact that he 
holds the criteria of relative cost and benefit (and 
has to compare marginal utilities attached to each 
good in order to maximize his overall utility) as 
sovereign guidelines for choosing among different 
options and in rank-ordering his preferences. The 
freedom of rational man is also constrained by the 
pursuit of internal consistency of choice. He is not 
to have contradictory desires or beliefs. He is to be 
exacting and careful in his comparisons, exercising 
the utmost effort to comply with the rule of consis-
tency (Sen 1985: 109). Finally, rational man of clas-
sical economics is selfish. The final constraint on 
his action is exercised by his unrelenting pursuit of 
self-interest which informs all his choices (Sen 1985: 
109-111). 4 In sum, rational man of the classical eco-
nomics is desirous, calculating, consistent and self-
ish. And, the three criteria of rationality - calcu-
lus, consistency, selfishness - organize his desires. 
ited resources which constrain his choices. His deci-
sion-making problem, then, consists, first of all, in 
the disposition or allocation problem - how to dis-
tribute scarce resources among the multiple, desirable 
goals (Hogarth and Reder 1987: 1-3). 
3 Not in the terms of the classical model, which 
sees only the actual resources as a constraint, but 
rather from a point of view of the model-generated 
"logic of action". 
4 Sen himself argues against conflating consi-
stency with self-interest (Sen, 1985:109). 
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Now, this model of action has managed to usurp a mono-
polistic, exclusive position not only in economics and 
decision theory, but also in much of organizational 
sociology. The model has captured the scientific imag-
ination to such an extent that even its critics often 
have defined their views in terms of deviations from 
this model but not in their own terms. 5 Let me briefly 
illustrate this point. 
Simon's model of bounded rationality rejects the as-
sumption of complete information, certainty and perf-
ect calculability6 • Simon's man is defined as limited 
in his capacity to handle either complexity or uncer-
tainty. Yet he remains rational even in this model -
(sub)goal-oriented, cost-conscious, calculating, and 
(under) informed - al though his capacities have been 
considerably reduced. 
If Simon removes the assumptions of complete informa-
tion, certainty and calculabity, Schelling and Elster 
considerably weaken that of consistency (Elster 1986, 
1987, 1988; Schelling 1984). They take up themes, 
among others, such as contradictory desires, momentary 
impulses and failures of integration. They argue that 
5 See also Etzioni for this point in Etzioni 
1988: 93. 
6 
"The classical model calls for knowledge of 
all the alternatives that are open to choice. It calls 
for complete knowledge of, or ability to compute, the 
consequences that will follow on each of the alterna-
tives. It calls for certainty in the decision-maker's 
present and future evaluation of these consequences. 
It calls for the ability to compare consequences, not 
matter how diverse and heterogeneous, in terms of some 
consistent measure of utility" (Simon 1978: 285). 
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an individual has cognitive coordination problems and 
experiences some motivational conflicts, and that he 
is engaged in a constant battle to remain rational and 
to maintain self-control: human reason and/or will 
of ten cave in under the weight of contradictory de-
sires, momentary impulses or norms. 7 Schelling even 
speaks of a passionate self as one possible type of 
self which is sometimes alone in charge and alternates 
with rational self . 8 Both Elater and Schelling try to 
improve the concept of rationality by evoking the 
image of multiple selves - individual and organizatio-
nal - but stay with the model. 9 
7 History, even intellectual history, repeats 
itself. Once before the concept of interest denoted an 
element of prudent reflection and efficient calcula-
tion with respect to the manner in which human 
aspirations were pursued. It also implied peace from 
contradictory passions and momentary impulses. But, 
and this is a crucial point, the concept of interest 
understood in this manner failed miserably. Those who 
promoted this concept simply did not manage the task 
of demonstrating that it actually constrained aspira-
tions and passions or generated a normative-framework. 
In this sense, interest joined both morality and rea-
son as yet another aspiring but ineffectual tamer of 
desires (Hirschman 1977: 32-35, 40-45). 
8 Passionate self acts upon " ... passion, or in-
fatuation . . . all of those transient overwhelming 
moods that elevate certain values to absolute domina-
tion ... " (Schelling 1984: 89). 
9 In fact, Elater's own position is inconsistent 
- he argues as if he were improving the concept, but 
also as if he were rejecting it. He sees his own cri-
ticisms as introducing "[t]he slack in the concept of 
rationality" but also concludes in the same article 
that ". . . rational-choice explanation may fail 
simply because people act irrationally" (Elster 1988: 
64). In my view, his criticisms could be read also as 
a radical condemnation of the use of the concept of 
rationality - µnderstood as control and organization 
~ 
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Finally, Elster and Sen, for example, reject the mo-
nopolistic assumption of selfishness and replace it 
with a duopolistic assumption of motives. The argument 
is that the classical economic model is too restric-
tive in proposing that only self-interestedness can 
affect the choices of rational man. In fact, norma-
tive, other-oriented logic constitutes an alternative 
to that of selfishness, and helps to understand cer-
tain types of preference-ordering (Elster 1987; Sen 
1982: 84-106). 10 Again, as was the case in previous 
arguments, they seek not to reject but to refine and 
improve the model of rational man. 
In effect, all these criticisms taken together justify 
why one should not just explore the soft edges of 
rationality or its boundaries, but actually ask what 
other models of man should be constructed, or used if 
already available. Yet, as I have emphasized several 
of desires by calculus and consistency - under such 
conditions in which calculus and consistency fail to 
control and organize desires, and desires may be said 
to have come to determine the decision-maker in this 
very sense. 
10 Sociologists and political scientists have 
stressed what the rational man model omits - the nor-
mative shaping of individual preferences. A sociologi-
cal argument is that norms are constitutive of the 
rational man's means-and-ends schema (Durkheim 1951; 
Douglas 1986; Etzioni 1988: 67-113). A parallel polit-
ical science argument is that institutions select, 
rank-order, and vest "interests" with normative power, 
and, that, therefore, these interests (revealed pref-
erences) neither can be seen as the actual individual 
needs and desires nor have any primary explanatory 
power (Schmitter 1981; Connolly 1972; Ball 1979; 
Willms 1973; Balbus 1971). 
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times, most critics11 do not dare beyond the explora-
tion of the limits of rationality. 12 
The argument that we should entertain alternative 
models of action rather than look for facilitators or 
disturbers of rationality is also supported by another 
type of criticism directed at the rational man model -
one that points to a very important area of reality 
which the model cannot adequately address. Namely, it 
cannot explain either voluntary collective behavior or 
the voluntary creation of public goods. Mancur Olson's 
theory, which relies on the rational man model, makes 
a strong argument for why neither cooperation nor 
public goods should exist. Yet, cooperation and public 
goods do exist, and their presence needs to be ex-
plained. 13 
11 See Elster (1987) where he deals with the log-
ic of normative action, for an exception to this rule. 
12 See Etzioni (1988) for an extended discussion 
of how normative-emotional action logic functions and 
how it influences rational decision-making and the 
processes of a) information selection, processing and 
inference-making and b) the selection of means in 
structured ways through exclusion, infusion and indif-
ference (Etzioni 1988: 93-193). This approach shows 
how this "mixed" logic structures action, economic re-
gimes and economic and corporate decisions in partic-
ular, but also how it facilitates or disturbs rational 
decision-making. However, it does not treat emotional 
"logic" in its own right. 
13 Axelrod ( 1984) provides a game-theoretic solu-
tion to the problems of voluntary cooperation and 
provision of public goods: repeated interactions and 
the use of a tit-for-tat strategy. 
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Mancur Olson's specification of exceptions to his own 
theory points to both norms and emotions as alterna-
tives to interest. In his view, the problem of free-
riding does not apply to 1) sincere, self-sacrificing, 
disciplined and committed initiators of collective 
action, who are "altruistic" and "irrational" within 
this framework, 2) ideologically or leader-inspired 
groups, associated with revolutions and social upheav-
als, 3) non-economic lobbies which are altruistic and, 
4) by inversion of Olson's argument, groups with suf-
ficient emotional resources which can do without se-
lective incentives and coercion (Olson 1965: 1, 61, 
64/65, 87, 106-108, 160-162). 
To elaborate, Olson's major argument is that the ra-
tional man model implies "rational" free-riding when 
it is applied to collective action. Each rational 
actor is a potential free-rider who is concerned about 
not wasting his contribution, so that he always calcu-
lates if his individual contribution would be futile. 
Since for many types of collective action, this indeed 
would be the case, it either does not come about at 
all or, when it does, all potential free-riders turn 
into actual free-riders. The reason why collective 
action does sometimes come about is that the associa-
tion between calculus, sense of futility and free-
riding can and is at times broken. For example, either 
the presence of selective incentives or a measure of 
coercion can persuade the individual on rational 
grounds that his cooperative effort would not be fu-
tile and, thus, motivate him to contribute to collec-
tive action. 
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In Olson's own view, however, when this sort of "ra-
tional" calculation is not made at all, that is, when 
individuals are "irrational" or, in my terms, when a 
sense of futility14 is absent altogether, there is no 
defensible reason to apply the rational man model. The 
rational man model is not useful when ideological 
inspiration and altruism countervail the sense of 
futility or when self-disciplined commitment and 
heightened emotional resources accomplish the same 
task. In other words, not only coercion and selective 
incentives can solve the free-rider problem and moti-
vate participation on "rational" grounds. Ideological 
inspiration, altruism, commitment or high emotional 
resources also solve the free-rider problem and moti-
vate participation, albeit on "irrational" grounds. 
Although Olson's own remarks suggest that both norma-
tive and emotional resources firmly belong to the re-
sidual category of "irrational", prototypical explana-
tions of cooperation focus exclusively on the norma-
tive reasons for contributing to collective action. It 
is argued that in the realm of public and joint goods 
a rational individual may switch to another logic of 
14 A sense of futility is "effective" when the 
free-rider effectively benefits from the collective 
action undertaken by others who are more interested in 
the provision of a given public good, although he 
himself does not contribute. This situation only 
strengthens the free-rider's feeling that his own 
individual contribution does not matter. If all indi-
viduals were "rational" in this way and considered 
their potential contributions futile, public goods 
would be produced only by those "more interested". 
Flam: Emotional Man 13 
action out of a sense of interdependence and duty. 15 
The shift in the action logic occurs when incentive-
based, calculating rationality does not suffice to 
guarantee production of or access to desired non-di-
visible goods and when individuals realize that they 
are dependent on others for their own welfare. Under 
these circumstances, a rational individual will oper-
ate under a different logic, that of norms or commit-
ment to the welfare of others, even if it may mean a 
reduced expected welfare for his own self. 
As this prototypical explanation shows, but also as 
the current state of the art indicates, sociologists, 
political scientists, but even some economists, have 
already devoted so much attention to the normative 
action logics and dynamics, that, I would argue, there 
is no need to focus on them here . 16 Instead, in what 
follows, the focus will be on the emotional man model, 
proposed as a complement to those of rational and 
normative man. This model is constructed based mostly 
on the available sociological literature. 
15 The differing arguments in support of this 
view are: 1) normativist: norms are already in place, 
but become activated only when imperative, for exam-
ple, in situations where individuals know their wel-
fare is interdependent - Prisoner's Dilemma; 2) func-
tionalist: norms emerge when self-interest alone is 
not enough to safeguard or guarantee social order 
(which is often itself necessary to promote self-in-
terested rationality); 3) rationalist: individuals 
create norms in self-interest, to protect themselves 
from free-riding (Elster 1987; Sen 1982; Johansen 
cited in Sen 1982: 96; Etzioni 1985; Hechter 1987). 
16 See, for example, Parsons (1951); Luhmann 
(1985); Burns and Flam (1987); Etzioni (1988), but 
also Sen (1982) and Elster (1987). 
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2. "Pure" and "Constrained" Emotional Man 
It has to be noted that the model-construction under-
taken here is made more difficult by the fact that 
contemporary sociologists of emotion have developed 
their theories in considerable disciplinary isolation17 
and that only one classical sociologist explicitly 
dealt with emotions. 18 
It also should be emphasized at the outset that after 
presenting a "pure" emotional man, I will consider the 
constraints under which he operates. The distinction 
between a "pure" and a "constrained" emotional man is 
necessary to reflect the fact that feelings are rarely 
expressed in a direct and spontaneous fashion. On the 
contrary, normative, social, and strategic expecta-
tions combine to compel "pure" emotional man to manage 
his feelings. 
In fact, it could be argued that if for the rational 
man the ultimate selector and reducer of the broad 
array of his preferences are the limited economic 
means at his disposal, for the "constrained," but not 
for the "pure," emotional man the ultimate selector 
17 The war that they wage is against the over-
emphasis on a cognitive-normative man model which 
still dominates sociology and anthropology. 
18 Among classical sociologists, Max Weber con-
ceived of affective-expressive action as devoid of 
rules or logical constraints, Durkheim pointed out 
normative emotions, but it was only Simmel who dealt 
with emotions in their own right. 
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and reducer of the broad array of feelings 19 are the 
limited cultural and social means at his disposal 
which prescribe, proscribe and permit the expression 
of certain emotions20 • In both cases, there is a built-
in tension between the goals and the means. There is 
a certain cost attached to achieving a goal - whether 
it is to produce/consume or express something in so-
19 The traditional philosophical view is that 
feelings are subjective inner experiences of and about 
various emotions and that emotions cannot be known 
because they are individual, unique, private and not 
accessible to others (Farrell 1988: 73; Rorty 1982: 
159). Drawing on this view I reserve the term feeling 
for a "subjective" experience of an affective-cogni-
tive state, and contrast it with the term emotion 
which draws attention to "intersubjective," behavioral 
and circumstantial attributes of the affective state 
(cf. Bedford and Armon-Jones in Harre 1986). Some 
sociologists treat the terms feelings and emotions as 
interchangeable, but focus on their management and 
construction, thus, in effect, recognizing the dis-
tinction between private and socialized aspects of 
affect (Hochschild 1979; Shott 1979). Kemper sometimes 
distinguishes between real and displayed emotions and 
treats the latter as epiphenomena! (Kemper 1981; 
Kemper 1978: 41). 
20 Among modern philosophers, an emotion stands 
for an affect - a state of bodily agitation accompa-
nied by or interwoven with a contemporaneous cognition 
or belief and/or caused by an evaluative judgement or 
by a belief or a desire or their combination. In con-
trast to feelings, which are inner, incomparable, 
fleeting subjective states, emotions are socially 
accessible (Farrell 1988: 73, 79, 81-85). Sociologists 
debate whether norms or status-power cause and shape 
emotions, but agree that emotions are evoked by "real, 
anticipated, imagined, or recollected outcomes of 
social relationships" (Kemper, cited in Shott 1979: 
1318). Like some philosophers, sociologists fuse the 
physiological, cognitive and normative elements to 
constitute the concept of emotion, rejecting or draw-
ing on the work of psychologists in various ways 
(Harre 1986). 
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cially, culturally, and strategically legitimate 
terms, and, homo sentiens just like homo economicus 
cannot ignore this cost. One is compelled to sort out 
his preferences and manage his resources, the other 
sorts out and manages his feelings. Both are much more 
rule-bound than is "pure" emotional man. 
A. "Pure" Emotional Man 
If rational man is defined as free, consistent, cost-
conscious, calculating, and selfish, "pure" emotional 
man, in contrast, is unfree, inconsistent, cost-indif-
ferent, and other-oriented. 
As noted earlier, rational man is self-interested and 
self-referential. In contrast, a "pure" emotional man 
may be self-interested, but his feelings orient him to 
others. 21 Such feelings as love, loyalty, or respect 
bind individuals together, whereas such feelings as 
anger, fear or envy separate individuals from each 
other (Kemper, in Scherer/ Ekman 1984: 374). Feelings 
relate individuals to others and make these individu-
21 Aesthetic feelings and emotions are of no 
concern here, although it could be argued that they 
entail an other-oriented component, since taste is in 
part an intersubjective phenomenon. 
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als develop concern for the negative or positive wel-
fare of others.n 
In contrast to rational man, who is free and whose 
choices are voluntary, "pure" emotional man is unfree. 
Feelings have an involuntary character. They cannot be 
produced at will. Feelings invade or overwhelm. They 
connect or separate individuals against their will. In 
this sense feelings are spontaneous and generative -
they generate a sympathetic or antipathetic charge 
which informs the substance of a relationship. Thus, 
one falls in or out of love, or, feels sympathy or 
antipathy towards somebody for reasons that of ten defy 
rational analysis or one's own will (Kemper 1978, 
1981, 1984: 374; Simmel 1955; Rorty 1982). 
A "pure" emotional man is cost-indifferent - what 
matters is that he can express his feelings. And, 
these feelings themselves are non-quantifiable and 
non-calculative as a matter of principle. Positive 
feelings, such as romantic or fraternal love (soli-
darity), generate a willingness to share. One gives 
without an expectation of compensation. 23 Similarly, 
22 Emotions have an intricate relationship to 
empathy, but I omit this topic to simplify the exposi-
tion. Post World War II social scientists have mostly 
stressed the cognitive nature of empathy, but see 
Shott (1979: 1328) for an analytical distinction be-
tween cognitive and affective empathy. 
23 Disappointed or unrequited positive feelings 
may issue in attempts to convert the relationship in 
a calculable exchange relationship, but these attempts 
fail because it is very difficult to measure respec-
tive, from the outset incommensurate, contributions to 
an emotional relationship (Deutsch 1985; Davis 1973). 
r 
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pure negative feelings, such as hostility, whose ob-
ject are the characteristics of the other(s), defy 
calculability - the purpose is to destroy at any cost 
(Kemper 1978, 1981; Simmel 1955; Davis 1973). 
Feelings have a logic of their own. First, they are 
multiple or multi-layered. Secondly, they can be, 
roughly speaking, compatible or incompatible. Thirdly, 
they resist attempts at ordering or hierarchization 
(Nedelmann 1988: 28; Simmel 1955: 22-28, 35-55). 24 This 
means that "pure" emotional man can be either consis-
tent or inconsistent in his mind and his actions. 
Consistency refers to the fact that some feelings are 
complementary, such as, for example, insecurity and 
shame. Others are mutually reinforcing, for example, 
love and admiration. Inconsistency25 refers to the fact 
that incompatible, antagonistic or contradictory feel-
ings, such as, for example, love and hate often co-
exist in one and the same person. 26 Even the most ex-
24 In relationship to each other, feelings can be 
compatible, complementary or mutually reinforcing on 
the one hand, or antagonistic, incompatible, or mutu-
ally destructive on the other. 
25 Compare to Schelling's and Elster's arguments 
that an individual's desires may be contradictory, and 
to Hirschman's account of the history of the idea of 
contradictory desires. See also Etzioni (1988: 70), 
where he points out that psychologists, but not econo-
mists, assume a mix of motives and emotions that are 
at least in part incompatible. 
26 Simmel identified many, what I would like to 
call, "emotional constellations" of this type such as 
sympathy-antipathy, love-fear, loyalty-opposition-
competi tion, hate-guilt, accord-discord, dominance-
submission-def iance, etc. 
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treme and contrary feelings can co-exist within a 
single individual and be felt simultaneously in rela-
tionship to a single person or an object. And the most 
contrary emotions can issue from each other, such as, 
for example, friendship from animosity. 27 
So far, the attributes of "pure" emotional man paral-
lelled and contrasted with those of rational man. The 
following two - inconstancy and indeterminacy - under-
score even more the crux of the matter with "pure" 
emotional man: The fact that he is often unpredict-
able. The point with a rational man, after all, is 
that he exercises self-control and follows "rational" 
rules of decision-making. These characteristics make 
him predictable and, one could say, socially account-
able. In contrast, the predictability of a "pure" 
emotional man is considerably more problematic. "Pure" 
emotional man follows only his own feelings in choos-
ing a course of action, which, since these feelings 
may be inconstant, if not inconsistent and indetermi-
nate, makes the course of his action unpredictable. 
Inconstancy refers to the fact that even the most 
passionate or the most routinized feelings may come to 
an end. "Pure" emotional man's feelings are beyond his 
control and, therefore, may be in a constant flux. 
Love turns into hate, hate into love, friendship into 
hostility, etc. etc. This follows from what was said 
27 Simmel also identified many typical "emotional 
strings," such as love-indifference, love-hate, re-
spect-contempt, loyalty-opposition-competition, etc., 
which differ from emotional constellations in that the 
emotions are not felt simultaneously but one precedes 
the other. The term "emotional strings" is mine. 
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above about the nature of emotions - they overwhelm 
and invade, they are involuntary. Neither can feelings 
be stopped or extended at will nor, once there, can 
they be changed without a long-term effort of the 
will. 
Indeterminacy is at its peak when "pure" emotional man 
is ridden by strong, contrary and inconsistent emo-
tions, and when his actions are purely expressive in 
Weber's sense. In such a case, neither he himself nor 
others can determine how he will act. 28 It is uncertain 
on which of his contrary feelings "pure" emotional man 
will in fact act, since neither norms nor calculus nor 
status-power relations weigh in favor of any particu-
lar feeling. He may act on one "stronger" feeling or, 
consecutively, on two or more contrary feelings. 29 
To summarize, "pure" emotional man is unfree, other-
oriented, non-calculative, and inconstant. He is ei-
ther consistent, or inconsistent and indeterminate -
28 The theme of unpredictability has its own 
intellectual history. Hirschman reminds us that past 
attempts to make passions a predictor of action turned 
around the attempts to decide which passions are 
stronger than others and, therefore, which can be said 
to countervail and dominate the others. However, this 
method failed. Instead, interest, first as a counter-
vailing and second as a mild passion, emerged as a 
concept as a result of these attempts. But, very 
quickly, the concept left the emotional realm as it 
came to include reason and even moral precepts 
(Hirschman 1977). 
~ There is, of course, the possibility that the 
contradictory emotions will block each other and para-
lyze the individual. This is even more likely when one 
of the emotions is backed by norms, but not the other. 
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in the latter case, he is also unpredictable. When he 
is unpredictable, but also when his (intense and oth-
er-oriented) feelings escape his own and outside con-
trol, he may disregard and upset the elements of the 
social order. And, he lurks even behind the socialized 
and constrained emotional man - "feelings, while quite 
plastic, can be culturally manipulated only within a 
certain range ... " (Shott 1979: 1320, fn 4). 
This lack of predictability and of social accountabil-
ity gains even more importance from the fact that 
feelings are very powerful motives of individual ac-
tion which defy standardization - they vary in range 
and intensity from individual to individual and, thus, 
cannot consitute a basis of social order (see Foot-
notes 19 and 20). On the contrary, it is both the 
subjectivity and the unpredictability of the "pure" 
emotional man that make him a foe of the social order 
and, consequently, turn his feelings into an object of 
attempts at regulation, neutralization, and suppres-
sion. 
B. "Constrained" Emotional Man 
In general, it can be said that specific cultural 
sensitivities, status and power relations, as well as 
strategic considerations constrain the feelings of 
"pure" emotional man. "Cons trained" emotional man is 
not free to either feel or emote. He is expected to 
manage both his actual feelings and his emotional 
expression. He is to suppress the expression of and 
neutralize proscribed feelings, but to evoke and dis-
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play prescribed emotions. He is to follow social 
guidelines, so-called "feeling rules" and "expression 
rules," which entail a set of cognitive-normative 
expectations specifying not only the context-bound 
expected, idealized or obligatory feelings but also 
the appropriate quality and quantity of emotional 
display (Hochschild 1975: 302; Hochschild 1979: 563-
566; Harre 1986). 
Individuals who realize or are made to realize that 
they are defying any of the feeling or expression 
rules can resort to "emotion work" or "emotion manage-
ment" (Hochschild 1979). They can sort out and manage 
their feelings in order to reduce the discrepancy 
between what and how they actually feel and what and 
how they should feel. Apart from suppressing, re-work-
ing, and neutralizing the undesired feelings, they 
should also engage in manufacturing and manifesting 
the desired emotions. The individual ability and will-
ingness to do so is a measure of moral, social, and 
strategic competence, and, often involves cooperation: 
"emotion work can be done by the self upon the self, 
by the self upon others, and by others upon oneself" 
(Hochschild 1979: 562; Armon-Jones in Harre 1986: 33-
34) . 30 
Put succinctly, the control of feelings and the con-
struction of emotions presupposes three distinct types 
of control mechanisms: individual, group, and institu-
30 Compare to Schelling (1984) and Elster (1986). 
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tional-organizational. 31 But, as the present-day theo-
ries state, neither institutional-organizational nor 
group control are possible without self-control. This 
internalized, willed, intentional mechanism of con-
trol, which entails cognitive processes, such as self-
reflection, self-criticism and self-correction, but 
also feelings of trust, respect, shame, embarrassment 
and guilt, is at the basis of any social order. 32 
The construction of social order entails in part the 
manufacturing of expectational structures which de-
crease complexity, contingency, and uncertainty and 
which, when fulfilled, although not specifically meant 
to prevent the expression of proscribed emotions, 
nevertheless minimize the likelihood of undesired 
emotional agitation and of resulting unpredictability. 
However, when unmet, the very same normative-cognitive 
expectational structures define the realm of the unex-
pected, surprising, or disappointing which causes a 
display of proscribed, strong, positive or negative, 
feelings, such as fear, embarrassment, anger or joy. 
The shock caused by disappointed expectations may lead 
the individual to lose his self-control and to act 
31 The institutional-organizational presupposes 
the presence of rules, staff, selective incentives and 
coercion. The group presupposes opinion-forming and 
expression as well as the availability of sanctions. 
The individual presupposes a sense of expressive-nor-
mative integrity, a will, and a measure of self-es-
teem. 
32 Among historical predecessors of these alleged 
individual self-control mechanisms, we find virtues, 
mild (or benevolent) passions, interest as a mild 
passion, other-oriented, sympathetic sentiments, rea-
son. See Hirschman (1977) and Rorty (1982). 
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"unpredictably in a state of agitation ... [H]e may 
lose his temper in his agitation and forget himself, 
thus disrupting the continuity and reliability of his 
presentation of self and risking the loss of the so-
cial identity of his personality ... " (Luhmann 1985: 
41). 33 Feeling and expression rules, shaping both emo-
tional behavior and expectational structures concerned 
with this behavior, play an important contributory 
role in the construction of a predictable social real-
ity not the least because they also provide blue-
prints for handling the unexpected. They provide be-
havioral guidance even when normative cognitive-expec-
tations are violated (see below). 
In general, individuals manufacture prescribed emo-
tions to meet expectations formed on the basis of the 
prevalent rules. Already Durkheim's classical contri-
bution stressed this obligatory-coercive, routine 
aspect of emotional self-control associated with the 
presence of cultural norms. Cultures34 have their spe-
cific emotional profiles and sensibilities - they 
encourage some and discourage other emotions, grant 
similar emotions inverse or simply different moral 
status, or call for a similar emotion but require that 
it be more or less intensely felt. Norms concerning 
emotions - what Goffman calls expression rules - re-
33 In his theory of law, Luhmann assigns a cen-
tral role both to expectational structures which se-
lectively decrease complexity, contingency and uncer-
tainty, and to the social mechanisms for handling, 
channelling and cooling off disappointments. 
34 See Harre ( 1986: 10/11) for an interesting 5-
point argument for the cultural relativity of emo-
tions. 
Flam: Emotional Man 25 
fleet these cultural sensibilities which are obliga-
tory, and are experienced and expected as a system of 
rights, duties, and sanctions. These rules specify the 
time and place at which the encouraged emotions should 
be displayed as well as their intensity, direction, 
and duration (Hochschild 1975; Hochschild 1979; Shott, 
1979). 
Not only normative, but also hierarchical orders and 
strategic considerations issue in rules which make for 
emotional self-control. Status and power structures 
are embodied in a system of feeling and expression 
rules. Positive emotions are supposed to flow up and 
negative emotions are supposed to flow down in the 
affirmation of the social hierarchy. The exercise of 
self-control is a necessary pre-requisite of these 
flows, in particular when these flows ignore and defy 
individual status and power aspirations (Kemper 1981; 
Hochschild 1975). 35 Similarly, an appropriate control 
of emotional expressions and of displayed sensitivi-
ties (rules of etiquette) confirms one's own social 
and cultural competence but also affirms the social 
order. Finally, strategic considerations, formed on 
the basis of normative or instrumental goals, motivate 
the specifics of individual self-control - the display 
of unfelt emotions and the suppression of felt feel-
ings - desired for the sake of impression management. 
Strategic considerations also inform individual calcu-
lations concerning the choice of techniques (discre-
35 Kemper argues that 11 feeling rules, 11 which 
Shott and Hochschild describe, are a function of and 
should be reduced to rules attached to status-power 
structures. He does not grant any autonomy to culture. 
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tion, concealment, feigned indifference, emotional 
blackmail, etc.) by which desired emotions as expected 
outcomes can be produced or neutralized in oneself or 
others (Hochschild 1979; Nedelmann 1988: 30; Goffman 
1969). 
Durkheim also stressed another important social cause 
of intended emotional construction: norm violations. 
When normative expectations are not met, and deeply 
felt values are violated, a collectivity is supposed 
to react by directing strong, negative emotions 
against the deviating individual ( s). 36 Violations of 
norms should cause a prescribed production of emotion-
al outbursts. The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to 
the emotional reactions against the violations of 
feelings rules attached to a hierarchical order. These 
emotional reactions are prescribed and contrast with 
the emotions involved in the violations themselves 
which entail (not necessarily intentional) acts of 
defiant, proscribed emotional display (Kemper 1978; 
Hochschild 1979: 567). 37 
36 See Nedelmann (1986: 407) on "Dieser Durkheim-
sche zirkulare Prozess zwischen Wertverletzung - of-
fentliche Emporung - Sanktionierung - Wertstabilisie-
rung " 
37 Proscribed emotions are seen as being caused 
by two simultaneous processes: a) negative deployment 
of power and/or insufficient deference on the part of 
the power/status holders and b) unmet expectations 
concerning social acceptance and rejection on the part 
of the power/status-less. Proscribed emotions presup-
pose positive self-esteem on the part of the powerless 
(Kemper 1979). See also Morton Deutsch for an extended 
argument that it takes positive self-esteem, support-
ive environment, and a sense that redress is probable, 
for individuals and groups to begin to feel that they 
are treated unjustly and to turn self-assertive 
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In contrast to a socialized man and a rebel who, re-
spectively, follow or defy the established rules for 
emotional construction, a strategist is a professional 
manipulator of these rules. A strategist not only 
distantiates himself from but also thrives on and 
exploits these feeling rules as techniques which will 
help him to achieve his goals. By the same token, a 
strategist's greatest foe is his own normative social-
ization which may jeopardize his "professional" ef-
forts and cause him to reveal his "socialized" but at 
the moment unwelcome feelings, and, thus, his strate-
gic goals. 38 
When considering "pure" emotional man, I emphasized 
that he is unfree, cost-indifferent and non-calcula-
tive, other-oriented, uncontrolled as well as incon-
stant and unpredictable when ridden by inconsistent 
feelings. "Constrained" emotional man is still other-
oriented, but differs in his other attributes from 
"pure" emotional man. Through emotion-work and emo-
tion-management, he achieves a considerable degree of 
(Deutsch 1985). This is a fairly standard argument. 
See, for example, Barrington Moore, Jr. (1978) or 
Alexandra Alund (1988). 
38 
" [ o] nee norms are incorporated, their 
infraction is likely to lead the actor to display 
incontrollable minor signs of guilt, shame, and embar-
rassment ... these giveaway signs ... " (Goffman 1968: 
57). Similarly, the "professional" strategist can 
experience a disappointment caused by his unmet cogni-
tive expectations, which prompts undesired, yet burst-
ing feelings which, if displayed, could uncover his 
true reactions and intentions. Whether this disap-
pointment will in fact cause any emotional display on 
his part depends ultimately on his skills in self-
pre~entation and emotion management. 
' 
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control over and freedom from (some of) his feelings. 
He does not allow the feelings to overwhelm him. If 
they are contradictory or incompatible, he works to 
achieve consistency by suppressing or neutralizing 
some, while cultivating others. He is not necessarily 
completely free or in control, but neither is he an 
emotional slave. Instead, and this is an important 
point, he very well may be a slave of socio-cultural 
norms entailed in the feeling and expression rules, 
unless he is either a strategist who exploits them or 
a rebel who adopts a critical stand towards them and 
engages in their conscious re-definition. 39 
Moreover, "constrained" emotional man is also much 
more cost-conscious and calculative than "pure" emo-
tional man either because feeling rules have taught 
him so (for example, by defining a time limit for non-
reciprocal feelings or a social-status limit for re-
ciprocal feelings) or because he is aware of the costs 
of socio-cultural deviance. In extreme cases, it is 
precisely the awareness of the costs of deviance - the 
expected negative sanctions - that is the sole ground 
for emotion-management and emotion-work in which he 
39 A social actor merely follows socio-cultural 
rules according to a functional-structural perspective 
emphasizing socialization and internalization proc-
esses. A social actor interprets, reflects upon, com-
municates about and modifies socio-cultural rules 
according to a constructivist perspective. The "con-
strained" emotional man model presented here fits more 
the first perspective not because it is preferable, 
but because the students of emotion, even though some 
draw on the constructivist perspective, in fact have 
very little to say about why and how social actors 
work to modify feeling and expression rules (see Hoch-
schild 1975; Scheff 1988; ~hott 1979; Harre 1986). 
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engages to manufacture prescribed emotions and to 
neutralize and suppress the proscribed feelings. 
In sum, "constrained" emotional man approximates ei-
ther a rational or a normative man. He is much more 
consistent, constant, and predictable than "pure" 
emotional man to the extent to which he allows these 
alternative logics of action influence his actual 
behavior. He mixes the normative and rational action 
logics when he exercises self-control, becomes cost-
conscious, pursues consistency and engages in emotion-
work and emotion-management in order to comply with 
norms. The success of his efforts is predicated upon 
the presence of a stable system which not only pro-
duces internally consistent and predictable expectati-
onal structures, but also provides the means for their 
realization. 
3. Collective Action Reconsidered in the Light of an 
Emotional Interaction Model 
So far I have briefly referred to prescribed and pro-
scribed emotional expression, and contrasted the logic 
of "pure" with that of "constrained" emotional action. 
In the following, I return to an objection raised 
earlier against the rational man model - that it can-
not explain adequately voluntary cooperation and pub-
lic goods - in order to argue that the emotional man 
model can explain them, at least partially. 
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Of all emotional interindividual interaction models 
developed by sociologists, I select a model of "love" 
because it addresses the theme of cooperation and 
therefore is the most relevant to my overall polemical 
argument. But, it must be noted that the presentation 
of this model is also meant to convince the reader 
that emotional interaction models can and have been 
constructed, 40 and that they can handle both self-rein-
forcing and contradictory emotions or a mixture of 
both. 41 
The model of an "emotional unity-discord" presented 
below, pertains not only to dyadic intimate relation-
ships, but also to individuals who voluntarily join a 
collectivity. The model pinpoints contradictory emo-
tions at work and periodizes a typical emotional se-
quence in which interacting individuals move between 
emotional indifference and emotional engagement. Over 
time, but also structurally speaking, there are two 
distinct developmental trajectories possible in a dyad 
or a collectivity: isolation-unity-isolation or isola-
tion-unity-consolidation. Taking the first trajectory 
into account, the model pinpoints the phase-contingent 
40 See Conclusion, but also, for example, the 
article on the escalation of anger in a two-actor 
interaction in Harre 1986. See also Sarbin's article 
in the same volume which suggests that a cultural 
repertoire contains stereotypic emotional roles, role-
interactions, and plots on which actors can draw in 
staging their "emotional-dramaturgical", identity-
asserting performances. 
41 For a model of self-perpetuating negative 
emotional contagion, involving shame and anger, see 
Scheff (1988: 396-397). 
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emergence of emotion-stabilizers, whose application 
issues in the second trajectory. 
Individuals, whether forming dyads or collectivities, 
experience contradictory emotions, which in the long 
run may undermine the very intention they have of 
merging with the other(s). 42 There is an inherent am-
bivalence built into this type of a relationship due 
to the contradictory emotional needs which the indi-
viduals bring into the relationship. On the one hand, 
they want to love, to experience communion - the merg-
er of the souls and minds. On the other hand, they 
fear that love and the communion may deprive them of 
their autonomy. 
Individuals want to merge - lose their selves in the 
others' - in part because of the tranformative nature 
of communion: in the "nascent" stage, the past re-
treats, the present is an expanding universe, the 
future is open and unconstrained. An individual self 
loses its contours and becomes united and enlarged by 
others. Joy and pleasure stem from giving for its own 
sake and from sharing the joys and the sorrows of the 
other( s). Love and/or solidarity are at this point 
still near-nonvolitional and noninstrumental - neither 
meant to stimulate reciprocity nor cognizant of the 
costs attached (Davis 1973; Alberoni 1984; Kemper 
42 Deutsch, Kemper, and Scheff argue that a cog-
nitive-emotional merger will occur and perpetuate 
itself without any obstacles if certain preconditions 
for it are met, such as: a) rough equality of power 
and status b) a perceived similarity in beliefs and 
goals c) open communication d) trust, friendliness, 
helpfulness. For an example, see Deutsch (1985: 69-
7 0) • 
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1978). The members of a collectivity experience the 
intensified emotional state and emotional group-conta-
gion43 wherein the entire group shares the same emo-
tions, whether gaiety, joyful agitation, sadness mixed 
with anger, or sorrow: " ... human sentiments are in-
tensified when affirmed collectively .. Sorrow, like 
joy, becomes exalted and amplified when leaping from 
mind to mind ... " (Durkheim 1915: 446). In the nascent 
state, solidarity and a sense of powerful potentiality 
reinforce each other: "Together, we can change the 
world." 
The very same individuals, however, may come to fear 
that they will suffer a loss of their own emotional 
make-up, distinctive individuality, sense of judgement 
- in short, autonomy. They may come to fear that their 
vital interests or status and power may have to be 
sacrificed too much. These fears may mitigate their 
willingness to merge with the other(s). Here we deal 
with an "emotional constellation," containing emotions 
which are contradictory and, therefore, account for 
inconstancy. While at first, individuals may act upon 
their willingness to merge, subsequently they may act 
upon their fear of a merger. 
For this kind of a relationship, typical relation- and 
phase-contingent institutional developments have been 
identified. Individuals engaged in a unifying rela-
tionship often recognize its fragility and seek to 
43 Note that in contrast to a two-person "emo-
tional contagion" with several different emotions, 
which Scheff proposes, this classical Durkheimian 
model posits an emotional group-contagion with shared 
emotion ( s ) . 
r 
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solidify it. Those more interested in the stability of 
the relationship compromise their interests and iden-
tities more, but, eventually, press for commitment and 
for establishing compliance-insuring mechanisms. In 
response to this pressure, the other(s) may terminate 
the relationship. However, if commitment is made and 
compliance-insuring mechanisms are accepted, avoidance 
strategies contrary to the spirit of the commitment 
can be punished. But, if these mechanisms fail, first 
persuasion attempts and then conflict escalation can 
be expected. If conflict does not settle the issues, 
separation (ostracism in groups) ensues. 
The periodization of this unity-discord relationship 
includes the first positive encounter(s), the emer-
gence and the cognitive-emotional experience of commu-
nion, a development of a sense of common identity 
which sets apart from the others, commitment, routin-
ization of the relationship, definition, detection and 
destruction of the sources of discord, confession-
forgi veness mechanisms, unity-reviving ceremonies, 
threat-persuasion re-negotiations, and, if these mech-
anisms, ceremonies and strategies do not work, con-
flict and separation (Davis 1973; Alberoni 1984; 
Zablocki 1980). 
Let me now propose that the model presented above 
directly answers the concern of the critical econo-
mists that rational man model cannot account for the 
emergence of voluntary collective action or that of 
joint or public goods. Note that this model emphasizes 
the attractiveness of an interindividual merger to 
isolated individuals. A rationalist could argue that 
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this merger could be seen as a selective incentive to 
participation in the Olsonian sense, comparable to 
socializing, for example. The merger, however, cannot 
be unequally distributed and, therefore, is not at all 
selective. Moreover, merging with a collectivity is 
not a means to some (rational) end. It is an end of 
action all in its own right. And, it implies a near-
complete dissolution of the rationalistic self and its 
conversion into a purely emotional self - indifferent 
to both cost and consequences. 44 
Nor can the feelings of love or compassionate solidar-
ity, which motivate "participation," be seen as out-
comes of a premeditated decision and explained in 
terms of the rational man model. After all, the point 
with both love and compassionate solidarity is that 
they are nonvoli tional and spontaneous. They over-
whelm, and, thus, leave no time for information col-
lection, comparisons, deliberated choice, or bargain-
ing. Here we deal with Schelling's "passionate self", 
which sometimes is alone in charge and alternates with 
the rational self. And, it is of great significance 
that this passionate self can remain in charge for 
months, even for years. Many movements, intentional 
communities, and forms of collective action last at 
44 My argument draws on Pizzorno's, except that 
I emphasize the near-absorption of the individual self 
in the collective self, while he emphasizes the inte-
gration and the reinforcement of the individual self 
resulting from the individual participation in a col-
lective action. His is a life-long, dynamic perspec-
tive on an individual self, mine is a duration-limit-
ed, structural perspective focused on what happens to 
the self in a particular collective action, social 
movement or collectivity (Pizzorno 1986). 
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least a year before the absence of normative-instru-
mental stabilizers finally makes for their demise 
(Kanter 1972; Alberoni 1984). This is so because in-
teracting positive feelings can reinforce each other's 
self-perpetuation. 45 
Those who see this "passionate" account of the reasons 
for joining collective action as too romantic should 
consider a more rational yet related argument, which 
the model also suggests. Aside from emotions, the 
model stresses the importance of intentions, commit-
ment, norms, compromises and persuasion for the initi-
ation and stabilization of collective action. These 
elements complement Olson's dyad of selective incen-
tives and coercion. They point to the importance of 
not only the intentions behind joining, which may very 
well involve a rational and pre-meditated decision to 
switch from a "rationalist" to an "emotional" action 
context offered by a collectivity, but also of negoti-
ated-consensual, processual-interactional stabilizers 
of collective action, which Olson ignores and which 
emerge as a matter of contingency, i.e. only when the 
participants in a collective undertaking intentionally 
seek to stabilize it. 46 
45 
"Mutual conformity and respect lead to pride 
and fellow feeling, which lead to further positive 
feeling, in a system that seems virtually automatic" 
(Scheff 1988: 397). See also "Deutsch's crude law of 
social relations", which states that " ... the charac-
teristic processes and effects elicited by a given 
type of social relationship also tend to elicit that 
type of social relationship" (Deutsch 1985: 69). 
46 On this very point see Kanter ( 1972: 133, 
1.89) . 
' 
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As important as the intentions and the processual-
interactional stabilizers of collective action are, 
they should not be allowed to overshadow the impor-
tance of the initial emotional charge generated by a 
sense of unity among individuals engaged in a merger. 
This emotional charge is prior to the emergence of 
norms meant to stabilize the collectivity as well as 
to the formation of interests in or against this sta-
bilization. And, most importantly, it is this initial 
emotional charge which suggests why a "threshold to 
collective action" may be easier to overcome than the 
rational man model suggests (Granovetter 1978; Oliver/ 
Marwell/ Teixeira 1985) . 47 "Emotional," non-calculative 
individuals or charismatic leaders, whose importance 
Mancur Olson recognizes, often initiate collective ac-
tion, since, for them, participation is costless. 
Their participation, in turn, lowers the costs of 
JoJ.ning for the rational, calculative individuals. 
Along with those who join compelled by their sense of 
duty, these two types of individuals combine in col-
lective action. In this sense, the emotional charge, 
capable of overcoming the sense of futility, provides 
a straightforward complement/alternative to self-in-
terest or a sense of duty, which are evoked by econo-
mists as the reasons behind collective action aimed at 
47 Says Jean Cohen, drawing on Pizzorno: " ... only 
if one sees solidarity and identity as goals of group 
formation ... can one see that, with respect to these 
goals, collective action is costless" (Cohen 1985: 
687). Say Oliver, Marwell and Teixeira: " ... an 'irra-
tional' contributor may well find that, instead of 
being a 'patsy,' he or she is a role model or organiz-
er whose action sets off others' actions and, in the 
end, vindicates the original contribution" (Oliver/ 
Marwell/ Teixeira 1985: 547). 
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the provision of public or joint goods. 48 It is impor-
tant to note that, in contrast to both normative and 
rational collective action models, the emotional model 
implies that the production of public or joint goods 
is an unintended consequence of an intended successful 
merger on the part of "emotional," non-calculative 
individuals. 
Let me now switch the perspective on collective action 
for a moment to round off the stabilization argument. 
So far I have mostly focused on "positive" emotional 
elements inherent in collective action. But collective 
action, as a purely emotional phenomenon, is also 
associated with "negative" emotions. Fear, anxiety, 
and anger precede, while hate and hostility often 
accompany collective action. 49 In fact, until recently, 
most sociological studies of collective behavior and 
social movements have focused on these emotions (Smel-
ser 1962; Gurr 1970; Cohen 1985). While positive emo-
tions are directed inwards and reserved for the mem-
bers of the collectivity, these negative emotions are 
directed outwards, towards the group(s) defined as the 
foe. What is of the utmost significance for the argu-
ment developed here is that these negative feelings 
help to consolidate and stabilize many different types 
48 1 It seems ike a minor point of contention, so 
I leave it out of the text, but individuals engaged in 
a collectivity may shirk from their duties not because 
of a sense of effective futility, but because of: emo-
tional-cognitive discord; routinized emotional indif-
ference or defiance; intention to leave, kept in check 
by commitment, etc. 
49 See Cohen (1985: 672) for a brief recent ac-
count of this perspective on collective behavior. 
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of collectivities and collective actions (Douglas/ 
Wildavsky 1983; Douglas 1986). Thus, not only can 
collective action be stabilized by the self-reinforc-
ing character of mutual positive feelings within a 
solidaristic group, but also by the negative feelings 
directed outwards. 
As I stated in the introduction, I see the emotional 
man model not as a substitute, but as a complement to 
both rational and normative models. This is because 
the other two models are needed to explain what the 
emotional man model cannot explain in its own terms, 
such phenomena as, for example, non-emotional factors 
involved in the formation of a collectivity, in the 
emergence of discord, or in the stabilization and 
consolidation of a collectivity. In short, I advocate 
model pluralism instead of the present normative-ra-
tionalistic model duopoly. 
4. Emotional Corporate Actors? 
So far I have focused on the individual and inter-
indi victual micro-level emotionality as well as de-
scribed some emotions pertinent to the macro-level of 
collective action. Here I would like to consider emo-
tions in corporate actors. 
The usual perspective on corporate actors is either 
rationalistic or normative. They are treated as cogni-
tive, goal-oriented, problem-solving, decision-making 
and intervening actors with their own interests and 
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strategies or with their own value-systems and norms. 
Yet, corporate actors are composed of individuals, and 
some - family-owned business firms, for example - are 
designed and owned by single individuals. Moreover, 
many corporate actors, such as political parties, 
trade unions, professional associations, or lobbies, 
have evolved from collective action. For both these 
reasons it should be legitimate to ask if corporate 
actors are in fact as immune to emotions as the ratio-
nalistic or strict normative perspective would imply. 
If, as I have argued so far, emotions play a signifi-
cant role both in individual and collective life, then 
it follows that they should also play some role in 
corporate life as well. 50 The purpose of this section 
is to consider this possibility. 
Thesis 1: Corporate Actors are Emotion Motivated Emo-
tion Managers who Construct Emotions. 
The term "corporate actor" refers to a wide variety of 
formal-legal organizations, ranging from business 
firms to charitable foundations. Upon a closer inspec-
tion, not all, but sufficiently many of these formal 
organizations can be analyzed as a set of legal-ratio-
nal rules for emotion management and a substitute for 
authentic feelings. I would like to suggest that what 
50 h Yet anot er reason for considering the rela-
tionship between emotions and corporate actors is that 
cultural and emotional sensibilities have been attrib-
uted to and studied in social and occupational groups, 
classes, and elites, and, there is no reason why orga-
nizations or corporate actors should be set apart in 
this respect. 
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these organizations produce, apart from everything 
else, are tempered (restrained, disciplined) but so-
lidified and permanent emotions in place of unpredict-
able and wavering, often boundless feelings. For exam-
ple, a business firm - one of the supposedly most 
rationalistic corporate actors - can be seen as a 
complex system of legal-rational checks, restraints 
and balancing procedures imposed on the otherwise 
boundless and irrational impulse of acquisitiveness, 
on the one hand, and on the equally boundless and 
self-indulgent impulse to consume, on the other (Weber 
1978: 9). Many trusts, philanthropic foundations, 
welfare organizations and state departments are sys-
tems created, among other reasons, in order to solidi-
fy and regulate otherwise intermittent, arbitrary and 
unplanned feelings of compassion for the needy (Barber 
1983; McGill 1941/2: 280). Professional and trade 
organizations, finally, are corporate actors whose one 
important purpose is to stabilize and regulate intra-
group solidarity, but also to inspire and stabilize 
public trust (Barber 1983). 
From this perspective, such corporate goals as "prof-
it-realization" or "help to the needy" or "solidarity" 
can be seen as intentions to construct and sustain 
specific emotions, while corporate rules can be seen 
as emotion-managing rules which prescribe in what ways 
these emotions should be constructed and displayed. 
For example, the corporate (expression) rules of a 
business firm specify the desired intensity, direction 
and duration of acquisitiveness and consumption when 
they specify the levels at which profits and invest-
ments are to be made, require that profits be made in 
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a peaceful manner, and set up the time frames within 
which the profits are to be achieved. 
Earlier, I suggested a distinction between subjective 
feelings and constructed emotions, reflected in a 
distinction between a "pure" and a "constrained" emo-
tional man. Here, I suggest a similar differentiation 
of concepts, to reflect a historical-cultural but also 
structural perspective on corporate actors. Following 
Weber's cultural-historical analysis, I propose that 
certain passions, feelings and sensibilities have 
existed in a "pure," unorganized, cultural-historical 
form in the West and that some of them have motivated 
the establishment of a rational organization - a cor-
porate actor - which would stabilize and rationalize 
their pursuit. But, and here is the structural part of 
the argument, once these corporate actors are estab-
lished, they may be said to construct emotions, using 
the available formal rules and procedures, which dif-
fer in form but remain related to the original feel-
ings which initiated the entire process. Moreover, 
corporate actors also generate emotions in another 
sense. They impose the constructed emotions on the 
individuals working for or living off them and, some-
times, they modify their own rules and procedures and, 
thus, can construct emotions only weakly related to 
the feelings which originally initiated the entire 
process. 
If this reasoning is accepted, then it follows that 
many corporate actors as actors are non-feeling, but 
emotional. Corporate emotions should be understood in 
the very sense in which I spoke of emotions in the 
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preceding sections of this paper - as intended con-
structions, formed according to obligatory-coercive 
rules, in this case, according to the organizational 
rules. Let me elaborate this general idea. 
Corporate actors require emotional display and deep 
acting from their members to sustain their self-defi-
ni tions which are related to their goals. Corporate 
charters and mandates often translate into formal and 
informal norms requiring the individuals working for 
an organization to manage their emotions in specified 
ways - to display particular emotions and to suppress 
particular feelings. Just like many jobs so many cor-
porate actors "call for an appreciation of display 
rules, feeling rules, and a capacity for deep acting" 
on the part of their members (Hochschild 1979: 570). 
Of importance in this context also is that individuals 
acting on behalf of corporate actors are supposed to 
construct "representative" emotions to help sustain 
the self-image of a corporate actor. It is true that 
as a rule, for example, bankers are to display re-
serve, discretion, delicacy, sensitivity as well as 
inspire trust and confidence, "ideal" state bureau-
crats and scientists are to display "affective neu-
trality," while business executives "may be required 
... to sustain a definition of self, office, and orga-
nizations as 'up and coming,' or 'on the go,' 'car-
ing,' or 'reliable ... '" (Hochschild 1979: 570). But, 
it is also the case that there is as much variability 
among the same type of corporate actors as among indi-
viduals in their emotional make-up. For example, a 
Communist Party may explicitly ban all interpersonal 
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emotional ties from its organization, and also require 
emotion-management for the sake of party goals 51 (Coser 
1974: 128, 131-135). In contrast, a Green Party may 
equally strongly encourage both affective-expressive 
"authenticity" and interpersonal emotional ties among 
its members. A welfare department in one country may 
display inquisitive compassion for the clients, while 
another hostility and indifference. Each of these 
corporate actors, then, can be said to foster and 
promote very specific emotional habits, "representa-
tive" emotions, in the individuals it brings together. 
This is also to say that there is enough variability 
among and between corporate actors to warrant research 
into corporate cultures, the preconditions for their 
emergence and maintainance, as well as their influence 
on the achievement of various corporate goals. 
A pertinent question in this context is the extent to 
which the obligatory expression and feeling rules and 
compliance degrees are the same for the principals and 
agents, oriented supposedly to the same goals. 52 Draw-
51 
"With this requirement, that all behavior be 
controlled and directed toward Party goals, goes the 
requirement that the Party member treat himself as a 
tool to carry out the wishes of the Party, but that he 
be at all times a conscious tool, voluntarily submit-
ting himself to the discipline of the Party. And the 
discipline must be minute and detailed, over himself 
and over his every movement . . . The eyes can lie - and 
how. You can express with your eyes a devoted atten-
tion which, in reality, you are not feeling. You can 
express serenity or surprise " (Mead, cited in 
Goffman 1969: 26-27). 
52 See for these terms Flam/ Ryll ( 1988) and 
Pratt/ Zeckha~ser (1985). 
' 
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ing on a related theory53 , one can set up at least two 
hypotheses. First, that those at the top of organiza-
tional hierarchy (the agents, to whom the principals 
delegate decision-making rights) identify more with 
the corporate goals, and feeling and expression rules 
and, therefore, comply with them more than the non-
decision-makers. Secondly, that the more hierarchical 
a corporate actor and the more power its agents have 
usurped from the authorizing principals, the easier it 
would be for these agents to develop not only autono-
mous goals, but also feelings, and expression and 
feeling rules, and/or ignore the rules considered le-
gitimate by the principals. In either case, it would 
be more difficult for the principals to identify with 
the agent-promoted rules if they have not participated 
in their creation. The following example, taken from 
Sweden, illustrates a disparity between the program-
matic agent-promoted "feeling rule" and the actual 
conduct of the principals. The leadership of the Swed-
ish central employee federation, LO, is very concerned 
with promoting solidarity between white-collar and 
blue-collar workers and between public- and private-
sector employees. However, the wide-spread presence of 
wage-drift and of insistence on performance-related 
wage relativities indicates that many LO members do 
not share the enthusiasm their leaders feel for soli-
darity as a feeling rule with redistributive 
consequences (Olsson/ Burns, in Burns/ Flam 1987). 
Despite the long-term attempts to impose this feeling 
53 See Mayntz (1970: 374-375), where the focus is 
on the relationship between morality, organizational 
division of labor, role-identification, and compliance 
with organizational goals. 
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rule on the LO-membership "from above," compliance has 
not been secured because the associated costs seem too 
high. 
Another interesting research question is if and how 
the organizational rules developed within a corporate 
actor or the external constraints under which it oper-
ates af feet either the actual feelings or the con-
structed emotions of its members. Here we are in the 
realm of both intended and unintended consequences. 
For example, German trade unions are supposed to pro-
mote internal solidarity, but the recently implemented 
organizational rules seem to weaken its bases 
(Streeck, in Lehmbruch/ Schmitter 1981: 249-284). 
German parliamentary party groups are at least to 
display, if not feel, internal solidarity in parlia-
ment. However, the competitive rules of political 
career-making make compliance with this feeling rule 
extremely costly for individual MPs who, when they 
follow it, lose valuable career-making opportunities. 
At the same time, the interparty opposition and dis-
plays of animosity in parliament actually help to 
reinforce the solidarity rule (Mayntz 1989: 9). 
As just pointed out, organizational rules or con-
straints may strengthen or weaken the corporate capac-
ity to observe feeling rules. But, the opposite may 
also be the case. A feeling rule may structure the 
division of labor, patterns of conflict and coopera-
tion, and the information flows within a corporate 
actor. It may function as an exquisite means of secur-
ing internal cohesion or compliance with the corporate 
goals, but also motivate undesired shifts in these 
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goals. The case in point is the feeling rule which 
operates in the British government. This rule states· 
that the ridicule which "the parliamentary Opposition 
tries to heap upon the government at every opportuni-
ty" is to be incessantly avoided (Heclo/ Wildavsky 
1974: 10-11). And, indeed, the constant fear of embar-
rassment accounts for most of the work load of the 
British ministers, their staff and the Treasury staff, 
cooperation between ministers and their staff, con-
flict among the cabinet ministers, and, finally, the 
type of information released up or across the govern-
ment hierarchy and to the media. Moreover, it also 
accounts for the shifts in the ministerial goals 
(Heclo/ Wildavsky 1974: 15-21, 55/56). This suggests 
that corporate actors, just like social and occupa-
tional groups or eli,tes, may rely on "controlling" 
emotions, such as the fear of embarrassment, or shame, 
or guilt to buttress whatever other (normative or 
~.:\ 
instrumental) means of control they have at their 
disposal in the organization of their work. 
Another aspect of corporate emotional life that can be 
easily studied is the variations in the triggers, 
frequency and intensity of emotional mobilization. As 
far as most Western political parties are concerned, 
it is the legal framework of each state which deter-
mines the election-timed frequency of their "routin-
ized," relatively non-intense, and regular cycles of 
mobilization (Nedelmann 1987; Flam 1988). In contrast, 
the Communist and Fascist parties, when in power, 
organize constant, high-pitch, minutely orchestrated 
mobilization "from above." It is the leadership and 
Flam: Emotional Man 47 
the staff of these parties themselves which typically 
trigger a mobilization. 
In bureaucratized and centralized trade unions, where 
normative-instrumental controls are imposed on the 
membership to prevent it from "spontaneous" mobiliza-
tion, a mobilization "from below" occurs relatively 
infrequently and rarely encompasses the entire member-
ship. In contrast, in decentralized and weakly bureau-
cratized trade unions, mobilization from below is more 
frequent and contagious. However, "top-down", leader-
initiated mobilization in both kinds of unions is 
difficult to achieve, albeit for very different rea-
sons (Schain, in Cerny/ Schain 1980: 208; Hinrichs/ 
Wiesenthal 1986: 285, 292-293). 
While mass political parties and trade unions differ 
from other corporate actors to 1 the extent that they 
have a considerable "collective movement" component to 
which "bottom-up" emotional mobilization can be at-
tributed, it is nevertheless clear that even business 
firms go through "top-down" cycles of emotional mobi-
lization, wherein the purpose is to heighten employee 
loyalty towards the firm, strengthen their commitment 
to its goals, and, thereby, to increase productivity. 
Employee loyalty is considered a functional prerequi-
site in the life of every business firm, but, the 
point is that top-down drives to secure it go through 
recognizeable cycles. In the West, such mobilization 
cycles seem to accompany economic stagnation cycles, 
but also periods of war mobilization. It is also com-
mon knowledge that Japanese firms rely more routinely 
on this kind of mobilization than European firms have, 
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at least in the past. These facts justify past and 
current research on organizational cultures as well as 
on national and international variations in business-
f irm cultures. 
Thesis 2: Feeling Rules Regulate and Emotions Accompa-
ny Corporate Interactions. 
So far I have focused on internal corporate feeling 
rules. But, it_pan be also argued that even intercor-
porate feeling rules exist, rules that could be stud-
ied just like the internal ones. 
For example, based on the available research devoted 
to national variations in collective bargaing, it can 
be pointed out that each nation has its own collective 
bargaining emotional culture. National collective 
bargaining systems· can be placed along a continuum 
wherein the polar interclass feeling rules prescribe 
either hostility or, for lack of a better term, the 
spirit of reconciliability, if not amicability. 54 These 
emotions are "representative," and negotiators on each 
side should display them in dealing with each other. 
If the leadership of either employer or employee asso-
ciation violates the rule, the members of the respec-
tive associations may be expected to signal dissatis-
faction or even withdraw a mandate to common negotia-
tions. 
54 Affective neutrality, associated with "scien-
tific expertise," would constitute a mid-point of this 
continuum. 
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The example above dealt with an intercorporate, vol-
untary, negotiation setting within which corporate 
actors interacted. The next example, concerned with 
national parliaments, deals also with an intercorpo-
rate setting, but one that is not only obligatory and 
permanent, but also imposes rather strict procedural 
rules about decision-making on the corporate actors 
operating in it. Like collective bargaining, national 
parliaments exhibit remarkable variations in their 
emotional cultures which cannot be understood by a 
reference to particular MPs (the turnover is too high 
for that). Rather we seem to be dealing here with an 
interactive, but self-perpetuating, obligatory-coer-
cive phenomenon which exacts its emotional dues from 
the MPs despite their internal resistance and annoy-
ance. One is struck that hostility, offensive insults, 
and aggression accompany the polemics between the 
oppositional parties in the German Bundestag, ridicule 
and embarrassment accompany them in the British par-
liament, and, finally, affective-neutrality and the 
spirit of compromise accompany the polemics in the 
Swedish parliament (Mayntz 1989: 17; Hecla/ Wildavsky, 
1974: 10-11; Nils Stjernquist, in Dahl 1969: 137/138). 
An obvious question that comes to mind is what ac-
counts for these differences in parliamentary emotion-
al cultures: political parties and the interparty 
feeling and expression rules they create, or, perhaps, 
the opposition-cooperation rules between the govern-
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ment and the opposition?55 The answer is to be found 
in empirical research. 
Thesis 3: Prescribed and Proscribed Emotional Out-
bursts in Corporate Actors 
As the last theme, I would like to treat emotional 
outbursts which can occur within and between corporate 
actors. The model of "constrained" emotional man dealt 
with proscribed and prescribed emotional outbursts 
(see section 2.B), attributing.them either to feeling 
and expression rules or to their breach. I would like 
to suggest that individuals working for or living off 
corporate actors can be expected to exhibit emotional 
outbursts for the very same reasons. 
Prescribed emotional outbursts within or between cor-
porate actors can be expected when the feeling and 
expression rules are violated, that is, when: a) "rep-
resentative" emotions are not displayed and/or the 
displayed emotions are interpreted as acts of def i-
ance, or b) behavioral norms, rules of etiquette or 
expression and feeling rules attached to hierarchical 
positions (within or between corporate actors) are not 
observed. 
55 Note that in both Germany and Great Britain 
there is no cooperation between the government and the 
opposition in parliament - the opposition is not given 
much influence, and is reduced to a role of a critic. 
This factor, then, is shared by both parliaments, yet 
their similarly "negative" emotional cultures are 
different, underscoring the need to recognize the 
importance of cultural autonomy in this type of re-
search. 
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On the other hand, proscribed emotional outbursts 
within or between corporate actors can be expected 
either when strategic expectations are disappointed 
and the strategist fails in the task of impression 
management, or when the feeling and expression rules, 
embodying the normative or hierachical orders, them-
selves become a target of discontent. 
Only the last case, I believe, needs some additional 
reflection. The feeling and expression rules produced 
by normative and hierarchical orders can become a 
target of discontent for "legitimate" reasons, for 
example, on the grounds that they make corporate or 
intercorporate goal-achievement ineffective. In rare 
cases, such "defiant emotional outbursts" may actually 
be charismatic, win principal or agent acclaim, and 
lead to the restructuring of the feeling and expres-
sion rules - and the means-and-ends schemas and orga-
nizational hierarchies associated with them. 56 Most 
often, however, these outbursts will be perceived as 
acts of defiance and receive a prescribed (negative) 
emotional response. 
Of course, "defiant emotional outbursts" may also 
reflect personal or group discontents, which may ulti-
mately reflect blocked career opportunities, inequi-
ties, denials of deference or power, organizational 
56 Recently many multinationals, threatened with 
a profitability crisis, replaced their managers en 
masse on the assumption that the new ones, brought 
from the outside and uninfected by internal corporate 
rules and cultures, would in fact behave as the kinds 
of charismatic leaders I describe here, and spearhead 
the process of innovation and rejuvenation. 
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strains and stresses, etc. etc. 57 Much of contemporary 
"corporate consulting" deals with, if not actually 
heals, this type of corporate stress. 
Ultimately, most corporate emotions can be classified 
into two groups: 
a) prescribed emotions include "representative" emo-
tions, tied up with organizational goals and the 
corporate self-image, and "controlling" emotions, 
such as fear, embarrassment, shame or guilt as well 
as anger with defiance. The "controlling" emotions 
back corporate goals as well as expression and 
feeling rules and constitute paramount control 
mechanisms; 
b) proscribed emotions include "non-representative" 
emotions, seen as obstacles to the realization of 
the corporate goals and to the appropriate presen-
tation of the corporate self-image, as well as 
"stressful" and "charismatic" emotions, both ex-
pressing, each in its own way, corporate discon-
tents. 
57 Defiant emotional outbursts may be preceded by 
self-blame, shame, guilt, sense of frustration and 
deprivation, but lead to anger and hostility - just 
like collective behavior theory tells us. Defiant 
emotions, in contrast to defiant emotional outbursts, 
may consist in self-blame and a sense of depressed 
frustration, go no further, and still lead to corpo-
rate distress to the extent to which they prevent the 
construction of the represenative emotions. In this 
sense, lax or absent emotion management is in itself 
an act of defiance. 
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Conclusion58 
In this article I presented a "pure" and a "con-
strained" emotional man model against the background 
of a classical and nee-classical model of rational 
man. Moreover, I re-stated the well-known fact that 
the rational man model cannot explain the presence of 
either voluntary collective action or public goods in 
the absence of selective incentives or coercive mea-
sures, and suggested considering not a normative but 
an emotional man as a potential, complementary point 
of departure for a solution of this problem. I argued 
that the emotions involved in collective action, both 
positive and negative, not only lower the threshold to 
collective action but even make for its consolidation. 
In particular, I stressed the role of a "pure," non-
normati ve and non-calculating, emotional charge in 
initiating collective action. Finally, with respect to 
corporate actors, I pointed out that even they can be 
seen as "emotional" and studied from a new perspective 
which presupposes that they are important construc-
tors, shapers and carriers of emotions and emotional 
cultures. 
Needless to say, the particular weakenesses of the 
emotional man model that I have proposed and of the 
arguments I have put forward should not be held 
against the "emotional" perspective as such. This 
58 I would like to thank the participants in the 
MP! Theory Circle for providing me with ideas for this 
concluding section. 
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article is meant as an invitation to others to open up 
and improve conceptually this perspective. 
At least one path for future pluralistic model-con-
struction can be proposed. The first step could in-
volve improving and contrasting normative, rational, 
and emotional action models. In this article I only 
have touched upon the characteristics of "pure" emo-
tional man and outlined the contours of an emotional 
interaction model pertaining to love to show that, in 
fact, sociologists already have done a bit to detect 
some typical interaction models based on contradictory 
emotions. But, it is worth noting that sociologists 
have also identified self-reinforcing emotions and the 
stable interaction patterns to which they give rise ( 
for example, internal shame in each actor combined 
with anger between these two actors) . Since these 
emotions are self-reinforcing and self-perpetuating, 
they can issue in typical, long-term emotional inter-
actional patterns. This focus is akin to Simmel 's 
classical contribution which posited emotions as gen-
erative of stable interactional structures. This 
amounts to saying that sociologists have developed 
models of "pure" emotional interaction and shown that 
emotions do in fact have an independent logic and a 
capacity to structure reality. What is needed is an 
effort to systematize this work. 
The second step would entail specifying typical ac-
tion-logic mixes both synthetic and temporal. A "con-
strained" emotional man model exemplifies a synthetic 
mix wherein rational and/or normative action rules 
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interact with "pure" feelings and shape emotional 
expression. Even here improvements and further speci-
fication are called for. Of interest in this context 
is the question which types of feelings are compatible 
with a parallel rational or normative action-logics 
and which can only be acted out spontaneously and in 
defiance of these other action-logics. For example, 
fury seems only compatible with a spontaneous, cost-
indifferent but either norm-oblivious or norm-guided 
act of aggression, while hate or "cool rage" seems 
quite compatible with a premeditated, cost-conscious 
and systematically carried out identical act of ag-
gression. Another unexplored area is the specification 
of the conditions under which an actor will switch 
from one type of action logic to another, that is, go 
through a temporal sequence such as, for example, 
love, calculus, perceived negative distributional 
consequences, anger, norm against anger expression, 
suppressed anger.~ 
Finally, unexplored in this paper and elsewhere is the 
question of the conditions under which "pure" emotion-
al man restructures norms, determines the choice be-
tween the use of selfish or other-oriented type of 
calculus, or hinders reliance on either norms or cal-
culus. This is yet another exciting task awaiting 
those interested in pursuing the emotional perspective 
on social action. 
59 Both steps could be executed not on a grand 
scale but in connection with a concrete research proj-
ect at hand where the research object itself would 
inform the selection of relevant emotions, emotional 
interaction models, logic-switches and -mixes, etc. 
56 MPIFG Discussion Paper 89/7 
In conclusion I would like to emphasize again my be-
lief that social research would benefit from model 
pluralism not the least because social phenomena are 
multi-dimensional: markets are embedded in norms, 
corporate actors are emotional, and the sphere of 
intimate relations does not escape rational calculus. 
It is an error to assume that each life or action 
sphere has its distinct and separate logic and should 
be studied with a model reflecting this logic. In-
stead, our efforts should be directed at detecting 
mixes of action logics and the conditions under which 
switches in action logic take place within one and the 
same life or action sphere. 
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